Contents

	27 Parties may question witnesses	12
	11 General powers of a court	12
	29 Manner and form of questioning witnesses and their responses	12
	26 Court's control over questioning of witnesses	12
Relation	ship between Act, CL and other statutes	12
	8 Operation of other Acts	13
	9 Application of common law and equity	13
Taking C	Objections	13
	Criminal Appeal Rules r 4 EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN MATTERS AS GROUNDS FOR APPEA	
	ETC	13
The Voir	Dire	13
	189 The voir dire	
Leave gi	ven by the Court	14
	192 Leave, permission or direction may be given on terms	14
Burden	of Proof	15
	Apollo Shower Screens 1985	15
Standard	d of Proof	15
Civil		15
	140 Civil proceedings: standard of proof	15
	Briginshaw Principle	15 <u>;w</u>
	Qantas Airways Ltd v Gama (2008)	15
Crimir	nal	16
	141 Criminal proceedings: standard of proof	16
	Green 1971	16
	Dookheea 2017	16
	Shepherd 1990	16
	Jury Directions Act 2015 (VIC) pt 7	16
Admissil	bility of evidence	16
	142 Admissibility of evidence: standard of proof	16
Prima Fa	acie Case	17
	May v O'Sullivan (1955)	17
	Doney (1990)	17
	R v PL (2012)	17
Calling a	Witness	18

1	1 General powers of a court	18
2	6 Court's control over questioning of witnesses	18
Civil		18
	Sharp 2008	18
	Clark Equipment Credit of Australia Ltd v Como Factors Pty Ltd (1988)	18
Criminal		19
	R v Apostilides 1984; R v Kneebone 1999	19
Crimin	al (Expert Opinion)	19
	Velveski v R 2002	19
D	PP Prosecution Guidelines	19
Competend	e and Compellability	20
Exception	ns: s13-20	20
1	3 Competence: lack of capacity	20
	R v GW 2016	21
	SH v R 2012	21
1	4 Compellability: reduced capacity	22
1	5 Compellability: Sovereign and others	22
1	6 Competence and compellability: judges and jurors	22
1	7 Competence and compellability: defendants in criminal proceedings	22
	Kirk 1986	22
Compella	ability	23
1	8 Compellability of spouses and others in criminal proceedings generally	23
	R v Khan 1990	23
	riminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s279: Compellability of family members to give vidence in certain proceedings	24
	O Comment on failure to give evidence	
	Unsworn Evidence	
	1 Sworn evidence to be on oath or affirmation	
	3 Choice of oath or affirmation	
	on of a Witness	
	6 Court's control over questioning of witnesses	
	7 Parties may question witnesses	
	8 Order of examination in chief, cross-examination and re-examination	
	9 Manner and form of questioning witnesses and their responses	
	Examination in chief	
Stage I.	GPI Leisure Corn Ltd v Herdman Investments 1990	20 26

Ryland v QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd 2013	26
Tootle v R 2017	26
37 Leading questions	26
Reviving Memory	27
32 Attempts to revive memory in court	27
33 Evidence given by police officers (CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS)	27
Dodds v R (2009)	27
Calling for a document	27
35 Effect of calling for production of documents	27
Unfavourable witnesses	28
38 Unfavourable witnesses	28
R v Garrett 2016	28
R v Hogan 2001	28
R v Lee (2002)	28
Stage 2: Cross-Examination of a Witness	29
Form of questioning	29
40 Witness called in error	29
41 Improper questions	29
42 Leading questions	30
Cross examination on documents	30
43 Prior inconsistent statements of witnesses	30
44 Previous representations of other persons	31
45 Production of documents	31
The Rule in Browne v Dunn	31
46 Leave to recall witnesses	32
Q: what happens if this rule is breached?	32
Browne v Dunn (1894)	32
Precision Plastics Pty Ltd v Demir (1975)	32
Payless Superbarn Pty Ltd v O'Gara (1990)	33
R v Birks (1990)	33
Khamis v R [2010]	33
Vulnerable Witnesses	34
Part 6 of Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW)	34
Re-examination	
39 Limits on re-examination	34
Drabsch v Switzerland General Insurance Co Ltd [1999]	35

Re-opening a Case	35
R v Chin (1985)	35
Morris v R 2010	36
Urban Transport Authority of NSW v Nweiser (1992)	36
Documents	36
47 Definitions	36
48 Proof of contents of documents	37
Butera v DPP (1987)	38
Foreign Media v Konstantinidis 2003	38
51 Original document rule abolished	38
Authenticity of documents	38
RUSU (1999)	38
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air N	` ,. ,
Wade v R 2014	
50 Proof of voluminous or complex documents	
Idylic Solutions 2012	
49 Documents in foreign countries	
Real Evidence	
55 Relevant evidence	
135 General discretion to exclude evidence	
Views – inspections, demonstrations and experiments	
53 Views	
56 Relevant evidence to be admissible	42
55 Relevant evidence	42
Smith v R 2001	43
Evans v R 2007	43
57 Provisional relevance	44
135 General discretion to exclude evidence	45
137 Exclusion of prejudicial evidence in criminal proceeding	s45
136 General discretion to limit use of evidence	45
Probative value	45
Papakosmas v R 1999	46
IMM v R 2016	46
R v Dickman 2017	47
Unfair Prejudice	48

	135	General discretion to exclude evidence	48
	136	General discretion to limit use of evidence	48
	137	Exclusion of prejudicial evidence in criminal proceedings	48
	0	rduyaka v Hicks 2000	48
	Α	insworth v Burden 2005	48
	La	a Trobe Capital & Mortgage v HP 2011	49
Prosecut	ion E	vidence in Criminal Proceedings	49
	137	Exclusion of prejudicial evidence in criminal proceedings	49
	R	v Sood 2007	49
	R	v Dann 2000	50
Gener	al dis	cretion to limit use of evidence	50
	136	General discretion to limit use of evidence	50
	Ja	ingo v NT (No 4) 2004	50
Imprope	rly ol	otained evidence	51
	138	Exclusion of improperly or illegally obtained evidence	51
	R	obinson v Woolworths 2005	51
	D	PP v Marijancevic 2011	52
	139	Cautioning of persons	52
	59	The hearsay rule—exclusion of hearsay evidence	53
	Sı	ubramanian v Public Prosecutor (1956)	54
	K	amleh v R 2005	54
	60	Exception: evidence relevant for a non-hearsay purpose	55
	Le	ee v R 1998	55
	Ja	ingo v NT (No 4) 2004	55
		urpose of the report was to prove reliability of rest of report, could get in under s60	
First Har	nd He	arsay Exceptions	56
Availa	bility	and Requirements	56
	61	Exceptions to the hearsay rule dependent on competency	56
	62	Restriction to "first-hand" hearsay	56
	S67:	Notice to be given	57
	C	aterpillar Inc v John Deere Limited (No 2) 2000	57
First h	and h	nearsay exceptions in Civil Cases	58
	63	Exception: civil proceedings if maker not available	58
	64	Exception: civil proceedings if maker <mark>available</mark>	58
	67	Notice to be given	58

	Franklin 2014	58
68	Objections to tender of hearsay evidence in civil proceedings if maker available	58
First Hand	d Hearsay Exceptions in Criminal Cases	59
65	Exception: criminal proceedings if maker not available	59
	Sio v R 2016	60
	Harris v R 2005	60
	Munro 2014	61
66	Exception: criminal proceedings if maker available	61
	Graham v R 1998	61
	R v XY 2010	62
	LMD v R 2013	62
	ISJ v R 2012	62
	Pate v R 2015	63
Other Excep	otions	63
69	Exception: business records	63
	Lancaster v R 2014	64
	Thomas v State of NSW 2008	64
	Lithgow City Council v Jackson 2011	64
	ACCC v Air NZ (no1) 2012	64
70	Exception: contents of tags, labels and writing	65
71	Exception: electronic communications	65
72	Exception: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander traditional laws and customs	65
73	Exception: reputation as to relationships and age	65
74	Exception: reputation of public or general rights	65
75	Exception: interlocutory proceedings	65
Vulnerabl	e Witnesses: CPA 1996 s306B – 306Z	65
81	Hearsay and opinion rules: exception for admissions and related representations	68
82	Exclusion of evidence of admissions that is not first-hand	68
83	Exclusion of evidence of admissions as against third parties	68
	Admissions made with authority	
Admissions	influenced by violence	69
84	Exclusion of admissions influenced by violence and certain other conduct	69
	R v Zhang 2000	69
Unreliable a	admissions	70
85	Criminal proceedings: reliability of admissions by defendants	70
	R v Zhang 2000	70

	R	v Moffat 2000	71
	R	v McLaughlin 2008	71
Imprope	rly ob	tained admissions	72
	138	Exclusion of improperly or illegally obtained evidence	72
	139	Cautioning of persons	72
	R	v Helmhout 2001	73
Risk of F	abrica	ition: criminal proceedings	73
	86	Exclusion of records of oral questioning	73
	Crim	inal Procedure Act 1986 s281 Admissions by suspects	74
	88	Proof of admissions	74
Unfairne	ess		75
	90	Discretion to exclude admissions	75
	Fc	oster v R 1993	75
	R	v Swaffield; Pavic v R 1998	75
	Er	n v R 2007	76
	R	v DRF 2015	76
Silence i	n resp	onse to Police Questioning	77
	Com	mon law	77
	Pe	etty and Maiden v R 1991	77
	89	Evidence of silence generally	77
	89A	Evidence of silence in criminal proceedings for serious indictable offences	77
Privilege	agair	nst self-incrimination	78
	128	Privilege in respect of self-incrimination in other proceedings	78
		onstruction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union v Australian Building and Construction ommissioner 2018	
	102	The credibility rule	80
Rela	ations	hip with Hearsay Evidence	81
	103	Exception: cross-examination as to credibility	81
	104	Further protections: cross-examination as to credibility	81
	106	Exception: rebutting denials by other evidence	82
	St	ate Rail Authority of NSW v Brown (2006)	83
	Co	ol v R 2013	83
Supporti	ing Cr	edibility	84
	108	Exception: re-establishing credibility	84
	R	v Ngo 2001	84
	Gı	aham v R 1998	84

	R v Whitmore 1999	84
	Nikolaidis v R 2008	85
	108A Admissibility of evidence of credibility of person who has made a previous representation	85
Expert Ev	vidence and Credibility	85
	108C Exception: evidence of persons with specialised knowledge	85
	Dupas v R 2012	86
	IMM v R 2016	86
	MA v R 2013	86
	De Silva v R 2013	86
Limits or	Credibility	87
	103 Exception: cross-examination as to credibility	87
	Palmer v R 1998	87
	Hargraves v R (2011)	88
	76 The opinion rule	89
	77 Exception: evidence relevant otherwise than as opinion evidence	90
	78 Exception: lay opinions	90
	Lithgow City Council v Jackson 2011	90
Expert O	pinion	90
	79 Exception: opinions based on specialised knowledge	90
	Tuite v R 2015	91
Opinio	on substantially based on specialised knowledge	91
	HG v R 1999	91
	Honeysett v R 2014	92
	Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar 2011	92
	Kyluk Pty Ltd v v Chief Executive, Office of Environment and Heritage 2013	93
	Langford v Tasmania 2018	93
Reliab	ility, s79 and s137	94
	Tuite v R 2015	94
Expert	code of conduct	94
	Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005	94
	Wood v R 2012	95
	80 Ultimate issue and common knowledge rules abolished	96
Characte	er of the Accused	96
	109 Application	97
	110 Evidence about character of accused persons	97

111 Evidence about character of co-accused	97
R v Zurita 2002	98
DIRECTIONS	98
Braysich v R 2011	98
Melbourne v R 1999	98
Cross-examination of the accused in character	99
112 Leave required to cross-examine about character of accused or co-accused	99
192 Leave, permission or direction may be given on terms	99
103 Exception: cross-examination as to credibility	100
104 Further protections: cross-examination as to credibility	100
108B Further protections: previous representations of an accused who is not a witr	
Stanoevski v R (2001)	
Case of Smith:	
Pfenning v R 1994	
94 Application	
95 Use of evidence for other purposes	
96 Failure to act	
97 The tendency rule	
Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees 2000	
Hughes v R 2017	
McPhillamy v R 2018	
98 The coincidence rule	
DIFFERENTIATING TENDENCY AND COINCIDENCE	
99 Requirements for notices	
100 Court may dispense with notice requirements	
101 Further restrictions on tendency evidence and coincidence evidence adduced by prosecution	•
IMM V R (2016)	
Hughes v R 2017	
R v Dennis Bauer 2018	
McPhillamy v R 2018	
Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Assault, <i>Criminal Justice</i>	
(Cth, 2017)	•
Competing Inferences from Joint Concoction	106
P.v. Hoch 1008	106

R v Bauer 2018	106
DSJ v The Queen; NS v The Queen [2012]	106
Civil Cases	107
Jacara 2000	107
Distinguishing non-propensity uses: same transaction	107
R v Falzon 2018	107
LJW v R 2010	108
Role of the Trial Judge and Jury	108
McKell v The Queen 2019	109
Judicial Notice	109
143 Matters of law	109
144 Matters of common knowledge	109
Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd 2002	110
Gattellaro v Westpac Banking Corp 2004	110
Aytugrul v R 2012	110
Maluka v Maluka 2011	110
Admissibility – judgments and convictions	111
91 Exclusion of evidence of judgments and convictions	111
92 Exceptions	111
Inferences from Absence of Evidence	112
Jones v Dunkel 1959	112
Criminal	112
Dyers v The Queen 2002	112
Weissensteiner v R 1993	112
20 Comment on failure to give evidence	113
Azzopardi v R 2001	114
Dyers v R 2002	114
Warnings: Potentially Unreliable Evidence	115
164 Corroboration requirements abolished	115
165 Unreliable evidence	115
R v Flood 1999	116
R v Stewart 2001	116
VIC JURY DIRECTIONS ACT 2015 - s32 Direction on unreliable evidence	116
VIC JURY DIRECTIONS ACT 2015 - S34 Abolition of common law rules	117
Warnings: Children's Evidence	117
165A Warnings in relation to children's evidence	117

R v GW 2016	. 117
CMG v the Queen 2011	. 117
JURY DIRECTIONS ACT 2015 - S33 Prohibited statements and suggestions in relation to	440
reliability of children's evidence	
Warnings: Delay and Credibility	. 118
Criminal Procedure Act 1986 - 294 Warning to be given by Judge in relation to lack of complaint in certain sexual offence proceedings	.118
Crofts v R (1996)	. 118
Longman v The Queen 1989	. 119
JURY DIRECTIONS ACT (VIC) 2015 s51-54:	. 119
Warnings: Delay and Forensic Disadvantage	. 120
165B Delay in prosecution	. 120
PT v R 2011	. 120
Robbins v R 2017	. 120
JURY DIRECTIONS ACT 2015: Division 5Delay and forensic disadvantage	.121
JURY DIRECTIONS ACT 2015 SECT 38: Definition	.121
JURY DIRECTIONS ACT 2015 SECT 39: Direction on significant forensic disadvantage	.121
JURY DIRECTIONS ACT 2015 SECT 40 Abolition of common law rules	. 121
Evidence of a Sexual Reputation	. 121
293 Admissibility of evidence relating to sexual experience	.121
Identification Evidence	. 123
Dictionary	. 123
114 Exclusion of visual identification evidence	. 123
R v Tahere 1999	. 124
115 Exclusion of evidence of identification by pictures	. 124
116 Directions to jury	. 125
Alexander v R 1981	. 125
Peterson v R 2014	. 125
MA v The Queen 2011	. 125
Pace v R 2014	.126

Unfavourable witnesses

38 UNFAVOURABLE WITNESSES

- (1) A party who called a witness may, with the leave of the court, question the witness, as though the party were cross-examining the witness, about:
 - (a) evidence given by the witness that is unfavourable to the party, or (harms your case)
 - (b) a matter of which the witness may reasonably be supposed to have knowledge and about which it appears to the court the witness is not, in examination in chief, making a genuine attempt to give evidence, or (don't remember)
 - (c) whether the witness has, at any time, made a prior inconsistent statement. 1 a-c sets out the 3 circumstances can XM for being unfavourable
- (2) Questioning a witness under this section is taken to be cross-examination for the purposes of this Act (other than section 39).
- (3) The party questioning the witness under this section may, with the leave of the court, question the witness about matters relevant only to the witness's credibility. *R v Lee*
- (4) Questioning under this section is to take place before the other parties cross-examine the witness, unless the court otherwise directs. **You get to go first**
- (5) If the court so directs, the order in which the parties question the witness is to be as the court directs.
- (6) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in determining whether to give leave or a direction under this section, it is to take into account: Factors as to whether you get leave
 (a) whether the party gave notice at the earliest opportunity of his or her intention to seek leave, and Realise not going way want
 - (b) the matters on which, and the extent to which, the witness has been, or is likely to be, questioned by another party. Whether or not the other party wants to question

R v Garrett 2016

The meaning of "unfavourable": in this case, inconsistency was sufficient. If the party calling witness contends witness should be able to give evidence supportive of that party's case, and witness fails to do so, may suffice to be unfavourable.

Facts: D + Police officer accused of assaulting the complainant. Police told witness what to say, inconsistent with what said under XM.

R v Hogan 2001

Considered a narrower approach: NSW CCA stressed the court should provide the bases for giving leave under **section 38(1)** and to ensure that XM is limited to credibility

- Cross-examination in this case was general and went to matters collateral in the trial. Focus of the trial shifted from whether the appellant was guilty of maliciously causing GBH to whether the witness was lying to protect the appellant

R v Lee (2002)

Scope of XM: S38 permits testing of evidence in chief to see whether matters contained in the previous inconsistent statement were true

Facts: police search, D flushes heroin. Girlfriend gave statement that it was D's heroin. Later at court said it was hers. Not helpful for crown

- S38 permits x-exam on matters of credibility to accept the prior inconsistent statement and to reject later sworn evidence
 - o It permits x-exam as to reasons, and motives, for that change

R v Dickman 2017

Follows **IMM**. Balance with unfair prejudice was whether it would be misused in any way.

Facts: German backpacker falsely claimed was member of Hells Angels to gain entry to a nightclub

- Was asked to ID german members and when couldn't, D threatened with knife and beat with baseball bat
- Prosecution used photo IDs of bikies in case
- Convicted, appealed on basis Judge failed to exclude certain ID evidence as was unreliable, prejudicial

Held: risk of prejudice to D was minimal, and conviction was inevitable anyway

- Trial judge accepted evidence had low probative value but the balance with unfair prejudice was whether it would be misused in any way.

R v Sood 2006

Its not the judge's job to discount probative value and exclude evidence because there is other explanations. Jury to decide.

Facts:

- D prosecuted for 96 counts of dishonestly obtaining a financial benefit by deception from the Health Insurance Commission
- TJ excluded evidence of receipt books and cash receipts thrown in a waste paper bin in D's clinic using the section 137 discretion.
- TJ held the evidence was not strongly probative because of the inference D may have been afraid of **being prosecuted for tax evasion**
- P appealed to NSWCCA.

Held:

- No evidence that D expected to be prosecuted for tax evasion and had denied in the VD that she had placed the receipt books and cash receipts in the bin.
- Even if she had, the receipt books and cash receipts covered a different period to that referred to in the charges.
- No unfair prejudice and appealed allowed

Lancaster v R 2014

S69(2): each representation within the business document must be measured against (personal knowledge)

Facts: D convicted of SA against 2 children, each with a file with the DHS. Files produced under subpoena and neuropsychologist gave an expert opinion based on the reports

- TJ said reports were not business records and therefore inadmissible, therefore so was expert opinion, appealed

Held: DHS engaged in care of complainant + entries were in course of caring therefore were business documents

- Each representation within the file would have to be looked at and measured against 69(2) individually

Thomas v State of NSW 2008

Document can't be made in connection with an Australian Proceeding

- Statement given during a Royal Commission = a tribunal, therefore 'obtained in connection with an Australian proceeding.'
- Also, like evidence given in court = a special class of evidence which does not have an inherent likelihood of reliability, unlike ordinary business records

Lithgow City Council v Jackson 2011

Without personal knowledge of fact, still hearsay even if a type of business document

Facts:

- J found unconscious and injured in a drain. Council only liable if he fell from the vertical retaining wall
- Document: "patient healthcare record" saying fell 1.5 metres onto concrete. Signed by two ambulance officers, neither gave evidence at hearing
 - o Admitted as per s78 as **opinion** fell from retaining wall
 - Also argued to be a business document, to get around argument that admissions were hearsay so s69 applied
 - o Appeal to HCA re: admissibility

Held: 69(2)(a) did not apply because officers did not have personal knowledge of a fall of 1.5m, because it happened before they arrived

- Had been told by bystanders fell in that way, who also did not have personal knowledge

ACCC v Air NZ (no1) 2012

Asserted fact applies to lay opinions

Facts: Air NZ objected to **minutes of meetings** on basis they did not fall within s69: entities not businesses and minutes didn't necessarily form part of records just because they were made

- "it was agreed that" are not statements of facts within meaning of s69, inadmissible opinions of minute taker

Held: Perram: opinion as to the existence of a fact falls within definition of "asserted fact" s69(2)

- HCA in *Lithgow* said this was "a little strained" but this was obiter and not binding to be followed

Limits on Credibility

- Re: boundaries of what credibility rule will allow
- What is line between fact, issue, and credibility of witness

PURE CREDIBILITY EVIDENCE: can only be admitted via XXM

 s103 means credibility rule will not apply if the evidence would substantially affect the credibility

103 EXCEPTION: CROSS-EXAMINATION AS TO CREDIBILITY

- (1) The credibility rule does not apply to evidence adduced in cross-examination of a witness if the evidence could substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of the witness.
- (2) Without limiting the matters to which the court may have regard for the purposes of subsection (1), it is to have regard to:
 - (a) whether the evidence tends to prove that the witness knowingly or recklessly made a false representation when the witness was under an obligation to tell the truth, and
 - (b) the period that has elapsed since the acts or events to which the evidence relates were done or occurred.

Palmer v R 1998

Line b/w evidence relevant to credibility and fact in issue is often indistinct: distinction drawn to confine trial process and be fair to the witness

Pre EA case

Facts: convicted of sexual offences against a 14 yo

- Appeal grounds included Qs asked in XXM, D had suggested to V she had accused D to pay him back for not giving her enough attention
- D XXM to suggest motive for this accusation, he could not do so


Principles:

<u>McHugh:</u> gave useful discussion of the distinction between evidence relevant to credibility and evidence relevant to a fact-in-issue

- Line b/w evidence relevant to credibility and fact in issue is often indistinct and unhelpful
- The probability of testimonial evidence being true cannot be isolated from the credibility of the witness except in those cases where other evidence confirms its truth
- The rationale behind the credit/fact-in-issue distinction does not depend on logic. The distinction is drawn to confine the trial process and to be fair to the witness.
- The fact that accused is not aware of facts suggesting a motive to lie does not mean there isn't one. But the accused is ordinarily in a position to know whether such facts exist.
 - >> If accused can give no evidence of this, it increases the probability that there is no motive.
- The prosecution was entitled to cross-examine the accused about motive because failure to reveal facts that might provide a basis for the complainant concocting her complaint might assist the jury to find that her evidence was true

Held: Judge's directions overcame the risk that the jury might reverse the onus.

 Now the exceptions to the CL "finality" and "bolster" rules (evidence given by witness in XXM regarding credit is final) are effectively dealt with in s 106 (rebutting denials by other evidence)



IMM V R (2016)

Despite probative value, must have **special features** in order to have "significant" PV

- While the complainant and another girl were giving the appellant a back massage, he ran his hand up the complainant's leg.
 - Trial judge -evidence capable of showing appellant had a sexual interest in the complainant, and that there was a strong temporal nexus between this incident and the charged acts
- Argued on appeal wrongly admitted and did not have significant probative value because evidence derived only from the complainant whose credibility generally in issue

Held: while evidence of a single complaint of D running his hand up V's leg was capable of showing D's sexual interest in V, s 97 needed more to be 'significant' PV

 Here –as it did not come from an independent source, difficult to see how it would add anything more unless the uncharged acts had 'special features'.

Hughes v R 2017

Case further developed meaning of 'special features'

- Here, the requirements were satisfied for SPV outweighing prejudice

Facts: lead actor charged with 11 counts of sexual offences against 5 underage girls

- P tried to rely on tendency evidence: evidence of each complainant and number of other witnesses (uncharged acts)
- Appellant said evidence was inadmissible because:
 - o Tendency was too broad to have significant probative value
 - Not all proposed evidence was relevant to each count
 - Sexual conduct related to different counts in different ways

Principle: the assessment of allowing tendency evidence requires

- 1. Considering the extent to which the evidence supports the tendency
- 2. "the extent to which the tendency makes more likely the facts making up the charged offence"

Held: even though the conduct in most of the counts was different to the other counts, majority held the evidence had SPV

- "level of disinhibited disregard of the risk of discovery"
- Force of tendency was not that he was likely to offend again, but that the evidence proved conduct outside of ordinary conduct

- (ii) is of events that are alleged to form part of a connected set of circumstances in which the alleged prescribed sexual offence was committed,
- (b) if the evidence relates to a relationship that was existing or recent at the time of the commission of the alleged prescribed sexual offence, being a relationship between the accused person and the complainant, (c) if—
- (i) the accused person is alleged to have had sexual intercourse (within the meaning of Division 10 of Part 3 of the *Crimes Act 1900*) with the complainant, and the accused person does not concede the sexual intercourse so alleged, and
- (ii) the evidence is relevant to whether the presence of semen, pregnancy, disease or injury is attributable to the sexual intercourse alleged to have been had by the accused person,
- (d) if the evidence is relevant to—
- (i) whether at the time of the commission of the alleged prescribed sexual offence there was present in the complainant a disease that, at any relevant time, was absent in the accused person, or
- (ii) whether at any relevant time there was absent in the complainant a disease that, at the time of the commission of the alleged prescribed sexual offence, was present in the accused person,
- (e) if the evidence is relevant to whether the allegation that the prescribed sexual offence was committed by the accused person was first made following a realisation or discovery of the presence of pregnancy or disease in the complainant (being a realisation or discovery that took place after the commission of the alleged prescribed sexual offence),
- (f) if the evidence has been given by the complainant in cross-examination by or on behalf of the accused person, being evidence given in answer to a question that may, pursuant to subsection (6), be asked,
- and if the probative value of the evidence outweighs any distress, humiliation or embarrassment that the complainant might suffer as a result of its admission.
- (5) A witness must not be asked—
 - (a) to give evidence that is inadmissible under subsection (2) or (3), or
 - (b) by or on behalf of the accused person, to give evidence that is or may be admissible under subsection (4) unless the court has previously decided that the evidence would, if given, be admissible.
- (6) If the court is satisfied—
 - (a) that it has been disclosed or implied in the case for the prosecution against the accused person that the complainant has or may have, during a specified period or without reference to any period—
 - (i) had sexual experience, or a lack of sexual experience, of a general or specified nature, or
 - (ii) had taken part in, or not taken part in, sexual activity of a general or specified nature, and
 - (b) the accused person might be unfairly prejudiced if the complainant could not be cross-examined by or on behalf of the accused person in relation to the disclosure or implication,
- the complainant may be so cross-examined, but only in relation to the experience or activity of the nature (if any) so specified during the period (if any) so specified.
- (7) On the trial of a person, any question as to the admissibility of evidence under subsection (2) or (3) or the right to cross-examine under subsection (6) is to be decided by the court in the absence of the jury.
- (8) If the court decides that evidence is admissible under subsection (4), the court must, before the evidence is given, record or cause to be recorded in writing the nature and scope of the evidence that is so admissible and the reasons for that decision.